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I. Introduction
The cross-pollination of technology and advertising has
1
blossomed over the last several decades. Armed with technology,
advertisers can entice consumer audiences with personal, targeted
2
messages about their products. Software programs target code words
in e-mails and social networking sites to tailor advertisements to a

* University of California, Hastings College of the Law, J.D. Candidate, 2011.
University of California, San Diego, B.A. Political Science with American Politics
concentration, minor in Literature & Writing. I would like to thank my faculty adviser,
Professor Jo Carrillo, for her thoughtful guidance and my family and friends for their
support in drafting this Note. I would also like to thank the Comm/Ent staff, Professor
Lothar Determann, Matthew Avery, Madhusudan Raman, and Raquel Friedman for their
contributions to the inception and development of this Note.
1. See, e.g., Don Corbett, Virtual Espionage: Spyware and the Common Law Privacy
Torts, 36 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 5 (2006) for an example of advertising and technology
synthesis, discussing a marketing evolution via the Internet.
2. See Targeted Ads in Gmail, GMAIL, http://mail.google.com/mail/help/
about_privacy.html#targeted_ads (last visited Apr. 2, 2011); Scanning Email Content,
GMAIL, http://mail.google.com/mail/help/about_privacy.html#scanning_email (last visited
Apr. 2, 2011); Facebook Adverts, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/advertising/
?campaign_id=402047449186&placement=pflo&extra_1=0 (last visited Apr. 2, 2011).
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person’s presumed interests. Social networking and online shopping
sites can learn or remember birthdays of loved ones to timely present
consumers with gift ideas via e-mails or messages on social
networking sites. The more advertising flourishes, the more invasive
technology becomes. While this hybrid species benefits most business
models, it might also be toxic to consumer privacy and property
rights.
This Note focuses on a recent advertising campaign that covertly
incorporated global positioning system (“GPS”) technology into
furniture that was essentially given away for advertising purposes.
Superficially, tracking the location of furniture may appear
unobtrusive. However, this Note is concerned with the intermingling
of advertising with technology that does more than sit passively in a
consumer’s home, but actually communicates information about the
consumer to the advertiser. Part II of this Note provides background
on the advertising campaign for Blu Dot. Part III discusses potential
legal causes of action Blu Dot’s advertising agency could face, such as
trespass and invasion of privacy. Finally, Part IV analyzes current
legislation protecting consumer privacy and proposes creating new
laws that will better protect consumers from these invasive
advertising tactics.

II. Background on the “Real Good Experiment”
Blu Dot is a Minnesota-based company that designs and
4
manufactures furniture with a modern flair. In the fall of 2009, Blu
Dot hired Mono, an advertising agency, to run an innovative new
5
The campaign, entitled the “Real Good
advertising campaign.
Experiment” (“Experiment”) was described as “a study in human
behavior, new forms of viral marketing and the recession friendly
6
urban phenomenon of ‘curb mining.’” According to Mono, the
purpose of the Experiment was to discover what would happen to

3. See Harry Huai Wang, Never Forget a Birthday, FACEBOOK (Nov. 14, 2008, 5:01
PM), http://www.facebook.com/blog.php?post=38780477130; Sara Schonfeld, Merge
Between Online Shopping, Social Networking Yields Privacy Concerns, THE DAILY
PENNSYLVANIAN (Jan. 27, 2011, 11:00 PM), http://www.dailypennsylvanian.com/
article/merge-between-online-shopping-social-networking-yields-privacy-concerns.
4. Our Story, BLU DOT, http://www.bludot.com/about-bludot-dir/our-story (last
visited Jan. 28, 2010).
5. Rob Walker, A Real Find, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2009, at MM26.
6. Andy Jordan, Busted! New Yorkers Caught Nabbing Street Chairs, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 14, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/video/busted-new-yorkers-caught-nabbing-streetchairs/04BEC9BF-E56F-43CE-8293-6A9B2CC8A70E.html.
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designer chairs left on the street: “Where would they go? Who would
7
pick them up? Where would they find their new homes.”
Mono produced a short film based on the advertising campaign
8
that promised to show “intrigue,” “love,” and “drama.” However,
the film more accurately depicted Mono spying on the lives and
9
property of twenty-five largely unsuspecting persons.
Mono initiated the Experiment by scattering twenty-five stylish
10
Blu Dot chairs throughout the streets of New York City. Mono
created a surveillance perimeter around the chairs to watch what
11
happened to them. Mono employees were positioned with cameras
12
on nearby rooftops and street corners. They communicated through
walkie talkies and used code names, working as a unit to monitor the
13
furniture.
Arbitrary persons then took the seemingly abandoned chairs into
their homes under the watchful eyes (and cameras) of Mono’s
14
agents. Mono filmed the chairs from the time they were dropped on
the street, while they were inspected by potential unidentified new
chair owners (code named “PUNCOs”), and until they had been
15
whisked away by identified new chair owners (“INCOs”). Mono’s
16
agents would follow the INCOs until losing visual contact.
Unbeknownst to most of the INCOs, Mono had hidden GPS
17
tracking devices inside several of these chairs. Mono posted a map
of the city on Blu Dot’s website with markers indicating the locations
18
of the furniture according to these GPS devices.
The website
encouraged viewers to watch the “journey” of the chairs until Mono

7. Id.
8. Realgoodchair, The Blu Dot Real Good Experiment: Trailer, YOUTUBE (Dec. 11,
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k0JHqGiHPo4.
9. See Walker, supra note 5 (Walker classifies these persons as “largely”
unsuspecting because Mono had advertised the experiment on various social networking
sites such as Twitter. As such, some of the “curb miners” may have been aware of the
experiment. At least one individual who found a chair located and removed the GPS
device.).
10. Id.
11. The Real Good Experiment Film, BLU DOT, http://www.bludot.com/bonus-tracksdir/rge (last visited March 5, 2010).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Walker, supra note 5.
15. Real Good Experiment Film, supra note 11.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Walker, supra note 5.
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replaced the map with a short film based on the Experiment. The
film also reveals that Mono used the GPS trackers to locate the chairs
20
at the homes of the INCOs. Mono agents knocked on the INCOs’
doors and asked to speak to them about their decision to take the
21
In these interviews, the INCOs
chairs in filmed interviews.
22
expressed surprise that Mono had been tracking the chairs.

III. Analysis of Potential Legal Causes of Action against
Mono for the Covert Use of GPS in the Advertising
Campaign
The integration of GPS technology in advertising is certainly
innovative. The Experiment drew so much attention that details of
the campaign made its way into premier publications such as the Wall
23
Street Journal and the New York Times. However, this innovative
advertising may reach beyond the limits of the law by infringing
consumer property rights and invading consumer privacy.
A. Infringement of Property Rights
24

Property rights are often analogized as a “bundle of rights.”
This bundle includes the rights to exclude, transfer, possess, and use
25
property. When the right to exclude is infringed upon, it typically
26
takes the form of a trespass either to chattels or real property. Thus,
Mono may have trespassed when it knowingly maintained a GPS
signal on its products after the INCOs had taken them.
1.

Trespass to Chattels

Technology has resurrected the doctrine of trespass to chattels,
“which had been largely relegated to a historical note in legal
27
textbooks.”
Chattels are generally understood to be personal
19. Real Good Experiment Film, supra note 11.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Walker, supra note 5; Jordan, supra note 6.
24. JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 4–5 (2000). For
discussion on the right to exclude, see Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 209 Wis. 2d 605, 617–18
(Wis. 1997). Accord Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (quoting
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982)).
25. See SPRANKLING, supra note 24, at 4–5.
26. Id.
27. Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, LLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1230 (N.D. Ill. 2005). See
also Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27, 27–28
(2000), stating:
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property that is moveable and transferable, unlike the immovable
28
The
land-based category of property known as real property.
chattels at hand are the Blu Dot chairs equipped with GPS devices.
Trespass to chattels may be committed when a person either: (1)
intentionally dispossesses another of their property, or (2) uses or
29
intermeddles with another’s property. This Part will determine if
the actions taken by Blu Dot meet the requirements for trespass to
chattels.
The comments provided in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(“Restatement”) explain that a dispossession occurs when one takes
30
or destroys another’s property. The film based on the Experiment
shows the only physical contact with the chairs after being taken by
the INCOs occurs through an electronic signal sent to the GPS
31
device. There is no indication that Mono repossessed, destroyed, or
32
even laid hand on the chairs. In the filmed interviews, the INCOs
were seen using the chairs and expressing satisfaction with the
33
chairs. Without further evidence suggesting Mono committed such
acts, this provision is not likely applicable.
However, although Mono did not physically dispossess property,
they may have intermeddled with the INCOs’ property. The
Restatement defines intermeddling as “intentionally bringing about a
34
physical contact with the chattel.”

[T]respass to chattels, which seems to have become the darling of
cyberspace lawyers. In a series of recent decisions, led by the opinion in
CompuServe v. Cyber Promotions, courts have used this obscure
nineteenth century claim to exclude unsolicited bulk e-mail or “spam”
first from the computer systems of Internet subscription services, and
more recently from corporate computer systems.
Burk also describes the reasoning courts have chosen to evaluate technological invasions
as a trespass to chattels rather than conversion because it is unclear that intangible
influences and properties can be converted. Further, conversion is a total dispossession
while trespass to chattels may be a partial interference. Id. at 29–30 (citing Thrifty-Tel,
Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)).
28. State v. Donahue, 144 P. 755, 758 (Or. 1914)
29. Sotelo, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 1229 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217
(1965)).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217, cmt. & illus. (1965).
31. The Real Good Experiment Film, supra note 11.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217, Comments and Illustrations, cmt. (e)
(1965).
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The Restatement illustrates three ways in which a person might
intermeddle with one’s chattel. First, an actor may commit a trespass
35
by intentionally touching another’s chattel. For example, “beat[ing]
another’s horse or dog, or by intentionally directing an object or
missile against it, as when the actor throws a stone at another’s
36
automobile or intentionally drives his own car against it.” Second,
an actor may also commit a trespass by inducing a third party to
37
intermeddle with another’s chattel through duress or fraud. Finally,
“[a]n actor may commit a trespass by so acting upon a chattel as
intentionally to cause it to come in contact with some other object, as
when a herd of sheep is deliberately driven or frightened down a
38
declivity.”
The Restatement further warns that “[i]f such intermeddling with
another’s chattel is done without his consent and without any other
privilege, the actor is subject to liability for harm thus caused to the
39
Courts have interpreted this to mean that while
chattel.”
“intermeddling” creates liability, there must also have been a harm in
40
order to award damages. However, the harm need not be a physical
harm suffered by chattel so long as there is a proximate relationship
41
between the trespass and the harm.
A strong analogy to the potential trespass caused by the
Experiment is electronic spam (“spam”). Spam is an “unsolicited
commercial message often sent to “hundreds of thousands of Internet
42
users at once.” In Compuserve Incorporated v. Cyber Promotions,
Cyber Promotions used Compuserve’s e-mail networks to send
“unsolicited e-mail advertisements on behalf of themselves and their

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. See also Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1065 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (citing Zaslow v. Kroenert, 176 P.2d 1, 18 (Cal. 1946)) (stating:
Where the conduct complained of does not amount to a substantial
interference with possession or the right thereto, but consists of
intermeddling with or use of or damages to the personal property, the
owner has a cause of action for trespass or case, and may recover only
the actual damages suffered by reason of the impairment of the property
or the loss of its use.)
40. Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, LLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1230 (N.D. Ill. 2005);
Glidden v. Szybiak, 63 A.2d 233 (N.H. 1949).
41. Burk, supra note 27, at 28.
42. Compuserve Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
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clients to hundreds of thousands of Internet users.”
The Ohio
district court found “[e]lectronic signals generated and sent by
computer. . . . sufficiently physically tangible to support a trespass
44
cause of action.” Furthermore, the court found that the spam e45
mails harmed Compuserve’s property. Though the spam did not
cause direct physical harm to Compuserve’s hardware, the court
found spam could diminish the value of equipment by draining
46
computer processing power and taking up disk space.
One court has also held that unfavorable emotions caused by
47
spyware can qualify as an actionable harm under trespass law.
Spyware is a “variety of software that operates covertly on personal
48
computers to track user behavior and display advertising.” In Sotelo
v. DirectRevenue, the court applied trespass to chattels in the context
49
of spyware. The court recognized that spyware can create technical
problems, such as causing:
[C]omputers to slow down, take up the bandwidth of the
user’s Internet connection, incur increased Internet-use
charges, deplete a computer’s memory, utilize pixels and
screen-space on monitors, require more energy because
slowed computers must be kept on for longer, and reduce a
50
user’s productivity.
In addition to physical harms to the computers, the court also
51
cited user frustration as a damage caused by spyware.
The Experiment did make use of the chairs taken by the INCOs.
Mono tracked the INCOs and advertised their locations online using
52
the device installed into the chair. It is not clear whether a court
53
would find that the INCOs incurred a tangible harm. There is no

43. Id. at 1017.
44. Id. at 1021.
45. Id. at 1022.
46. Id.
47. Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, LLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1230 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
48. Jacob Kreutzer, Somebody Has to Pay: Products Liability for Spyware, 45 AM.
BUS. L.J. 61, 105 n.1 (2008).
49. Sotelo, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 1230.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Walker, supra note 5.
53. See Susan M. Ballantine, Computer Network Trespasses: Solving New Problems
with Old Solutions, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 209, 212 (2000) (discussing the difficulty
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indication that the operation of the GPS device had in any way
54
The film based on the
diminished the ability to use the chair.
advertising campaign shows that the GPS devices were merely
attached to the bottom of the chairs and does not suggest Mono
55
Even if the
compromised the structural integrity of the chairs.
installation had caused any harm, it seems that those alterations
would have occurred before the INCOs had come into possession of
the chair and, as such, would not be a viable claim for the INCO.
However, the logic from the court in Sotelo indicates that negative
emotions caused by trespass can be considered in an action for
56
damages. This rationale opens the door to possible claims for the
INCOs against Blu Dot. For example, an INCO may have suffered
emotional distress after finding out that a GPS tracker hidden in his
or her chair had been publicly broadcasting its location to the world,
raising a variety of privacy and security concerns. Indeed, these
designer chairs had been widely publicized across the entire gamut of
social media and had sent some fans wildly chasing after these
57
chairs. Or perhaps shame derived by having one’s “curb-mining”
propensities broadcasted in various forms of media could suffice as a
harm proximately caused by the trespass.
Additionally, for policy reasons, a court could broadly consider
the impact of GPS devices being used covertly under any
circumstances in order to conjure scenarios with greater damages and
avoid setting bad precedent. Imagine virtual databases that criminals
might build or peruse, detailing exactly where they can find what they
want and who to target. Placing GPS devices in a watch or a car
could inform theft operations of when targets will be away from their
homes. This could lead to a loss of privacy and a corresponding
concern for security.
Even if a judge determines that the GPS devices caused an actual
harm, the INCO must be able to prove that the chair was in fact its
chattel. To determine the property rights of the INCOs over the
chair, the ownership status of both the original (Mono) and new

suing under the trespass to chattels theory and identifying harm where an intruder
accessed computer networks).
54. The Real Good Experiment Film, supra note 11.
55. Id.
56. In Sotelo, the court considered the emotional frustration involved in using a
machine infected with Spyware in the discussion of harm. 384 F. Supp 2d at 1230.
57. Don Crossland, Blu Dot’s Real Good Experiment, KONTAKTMAG (Nov. 5, 2009),
http://www.kontaktmag.com/blog/blu-dots-real-good-experiment/.
57. Walker, supra note 5.
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property holders (INCOs) must be evaluated. When property has
been separated from its original owner it generally falls within three
58
property categories: abandoned, lost, or mislaid.
Property is “abandoned” when the original property owner
59
intends to relinquish all right, title, and interest in the property. This
60
Where the owner
triggers the aforementioned bundle of rights.
intends to give up his right to exclude, transfer, or possess and use the
property, abandonment has occurred. Consider this example:
[I]f O deposits a broken toy on the sidewalk so that it can be
removed by garbage collectors, he has abandoned it. On the
other hand, if O merely leaves the toy on the sidewalk
overnight, intending to reclaim it in the morning, no
61
abandonment has occurred.
The act of abandoning the property means that the property
62
becomes unowned.
The first person to take possession of
63
abandoned property thus gains exclusive rights to the property. This
means that neither the original owner nor other prospective property
owners may exercise control over the property without the finder
64
granting such rights.
Property will be categorized as lost where “the owner
unintentionally and involuntarily parts with it through neglect or
65
inadvertence and does not know where it is.” To illustrate, lost
property would include money that unintentionally falls out of one’s
66
pocket.
Unlike abandoned property, when property is lost, the finder does
67
not inherit original owner’s property rights with the finding.
Interestingly enough, this also does not mean that the possessor
68
necessarily has no rights over the property. Rather, the finder is

58. See SPRANKLING, supra note 24, at 35.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 38.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 36 (citing Benjamin v. Lindner Aviation, Inc., 534 N.W.2d 400 (Iowa 1995)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 37–38 (“finder’s agent who mistakenly delivered found tools to third party
claiming ownership, but failed to check claimant’s identity, held liable in damages to true
owner.”).
68. Id.
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frequently given constructive possession over the item that can be
69
superseded only if the original owner claims the property.
Property is mislaid when the owner “voluntarily puts it in a
particular place, intending to retain ownership, but then fails to
70
reclaim it or forgets where it is.”
This would occur when, for
example, a person “momentarily places his wallet on a store counter
71
while paying for a purchase, and then leaves the store without it.”
Similar to lost property, when a person takes possession of mislaid
property, that person does not become the actual owner of the
72
property. Rather, again, they assume constructive possession over
the property that must be returned in full to the original property
73
owner should they later claim the property.
Applying these standards, it is difficult to categorize the chairs left
on the streets by Mono. Frequently, furniture left on the streets is
abandoned. However, it is not clear Mono intended to relinquish all
of the sticks in the bundle of property rights required for
abandonment.
It seems that Mono intended to release at least some of its
property rights. The point of the campaign was for the chairs to be
74
taken and to follow where they went. The film shows INCOs sitting
in the chairs sewing or playing instruments without evident
75
objection. Thus, the right to use the property has been, at the very
76
least, shared with the INCOs.
It also seems that the campaign gave the finder the right to
77
exclude people or to sell the property. Mono sent agents to the
78
homes of the INCOs to conduct interviews. In these interviews
some INCOs revealed their intent to give the chairs to other people,
79
without Mono or its agents contesting.
However, Mono may still be exercising at least one of the
80
property rights to the chairs: its right to use the chairs. These chairs

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id. at 36 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 37–38.
Id.
Real Good Experiment Film, supra note 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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were not typical abandoned furniture, where the owners are
81
unconcerned with whether they see their former possession again.
In fact, before leaving the chairs on the streets, Mono publically
82
announced that it intended to track the chairs in an ad campaign.
It is not clear whether Mono manifested the intent to abandon its
right to use the chairs until after the ad campaign was completed, the
83
GPS devices were turned off, and the camera crews sent home. If
this were the case, the INCO would have no property claims that
would supersede the authority of Mono’s exercise of rights. This
would preclude any trespass cause of action against Mono so long as
they continued to exercise these rights. Alas, by the time this intent
to abandon becomes clear, vesting the finder with actual property
rights over the original owner (rather than constructive right
subordinate to the original owner), any actions that could have
otherwise qualified as trespass arguably would have ended.
A counterargument does remain. It is possible to assert that
Mono did not maintain use of the chair, but rather that it maintained
use of the GPS device attached to it. However, it seems that this
argument remains in the realm of possibility without passing the
threshold of plausibility. Given the context of the advertising
campaign inviting consumers to watch the “journey of the chairs” that
carried their brand in an effort to advertise their furniture, it seems
that Mono intended to exercise the right to use both the chair and the
GPS device for profit, maintaining ownership rights over those of the
INCOs.
Determining that Mono’s operation of a GPS device attached to a
chair qualifies as a trespass to chattels would likely require a policyoriented judge. While not beyond the realm of legal precedent, it is
certainly settled on the fringe.
While the court in Sotelo
acknowledged the frustration of a property owner in its discussion of
what qualifies as a harm sufficient to warrant damages under trespass
to chattels, it is unclear whether an emotional harm, standing alone,
would be sufficient. Sotelo also included more tangible injuries, such
as the spyware slowing down computer equipment and draining more
84
energy.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. While there is no direct knowledge that the devices have been disabled, it may be
suggested through Blu Dot’s deactivation of the online map that had previously been
tracking the GPS devices on Blu Dot’s website. See BLU DOt, http://www.bludot.com/
(last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
84. Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, LLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1230 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
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Furthermore, there is a strong argument that Mono had not
abandoned the chairs while “intermeddling,” which, if applied, would
eviscerate any case for trespass. The judge would need to be willing
to separate the GPS device and the chair and find that Mono had only
continued to maintain a property interest in the GPS device. The
weaknesses in the claims of damage and ownership make a successful
claim for trespass to chattels improbable under the current legal
framework.
2.

Intentional Intrusion to Land

Mono may have committed a separate form of trespass for
intentional intrusion on land when it planted GPS devices to track the
chairs’ locations. The chairs found homes in the living rooms of
several INCOs. The Restatement explains:
One is subject to liability to another for trespass . . . if he
intentionally (a). Enters land in the possession of the other,
or causes a thing or a third person to do so, (b). Remains on
the land, or (c). Fails to remove from the land a thing that he
85
is under a duty to remove.
Courts have recognized that, unlike trespass to chattels, no
physical harm to the property is required to justify a trespass action
86
for intentional intrusion to land. In Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized that an actual harm occurs
87
when the right to property exclusion is infringed upon. In Jacque, a
housing company dragged a home across the plaintiff’s property
88
without permission. Though this act caused no physical damages to
the plaintiff’s property, the court recognized that the “right to exclude
others from his or her land is ‘one of the most essential sticks in the
89
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.’”
Thus, by infringing on the legal right to exclude, “the law recognizes
90
that actual harm occurs in every trespass.”
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965).
86. 563 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Wis. 1997); See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158
(1965) (a trespasser will be liable irrespective of any harm caused by the trespass).
87. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Wis. 1997).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 159–60 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (quoting
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). Accord Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982)).
90. Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 160.
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“The action for intentional trespass to land is directed at
91
In order to prevent a system of
vindication of the legal right.”
vigilante justice, the court recognized the value of providing legal
92
remedies for infringements on property rights. As such, the court
upheld an award of nominal actual damages and one hundred
93
thousand dollars in punitive damages.
Not only is it unnecessary that the trespasser cause physical
damages to be liable for trespass, the trespasser also need not
94
physically enter the property of another. Rather, the trespassing
agent can arise from nonhuman sources such as light, sound or
95
smoke. The Restatement flushes out this aspect of trespass, noting
that the trespasser must cause the trespassing agent to invade
another’s property without consent, where the trespasser had
96
substantial certainty that the trespass would occur.
Although consent is an affirmative defense to a claim of trespass,
there is case law supporting the proposition that perceived “consent”
97
based on fraud is not always a viable defense. The court in De May
v. Roberts found that consent could be nullified where the property
98
owner gave it to someone assuming a false identity. There, the
91. Id. (citing in part Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, IX RUTGERS L.
REV. 357, 374 (1954) and W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 13 (5th
ed. 1984)).
92. Id. at 160–61.
93. Id. at 163.
94. Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 n.6 (1996), holding:
At early common law, trespass required a physical touching of another’s
chattel or entry onto another’s land. The modern rule recognizes an
indirect touching or entry; e.g., dust particles from a cement plant that
migrate onto another’s real and personal property may give rise to
trespass. (See Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co. (1982) 32 Cal. 3d 229, 232–33
[185 Cal. Rptr. 280, 649 P.2d 922]; Roberts v. Permanente Corp. (1961)
188 Cal. App. 2d 526, 529 [10 Cal. Rptr. 519].) But the requirement of a
tangible has been relaxed almost to the point of being discarded. Thus,
some courts have held that microscopic particles ( Bradley v. American
Smelting and Refining Co. (1985) 104 Wn.2d 677 [709 P.2d 782, 788–89])
or smoke (Ream v. Keen (1992) 314 Or. 370 [838 P.2d 1073, 1075]) may
give rise to trespass. And the California Supreme Court has intimated
migrating intangibles (e.g., sound waves) may result in a trespass,
provided they do not simply impede an owner’s use or enjoyment of
property, but cause damage. (Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co., supra, 32
Cal. 3d at pp. 233–34.)
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158, cmt. (i) (1965).
De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146, 166 (Mich. 1881).
Id. at 149.
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plaintiff called a doctor to the plaintiff’s home to deliver her baby.
100
A male who was not a medical doctor accompanied the doctor. The
property owner assumed the doctor’s companion was a physician or
101
student.
Under this assumption, the landowner allowed the
102
companion into the home and delivery room. The court found that
though the plaintiff “consented to the presence of [the defendant]
supposing him to be a physician, [it would] not preclude her from
maintaining an action and recovering substantial damages [for
103
trespass] upon afterwards ascertaining his true character.”
Similarly, the court in Miller v. Brooks held that a person
becomes a trespasser when he or she exceeds the scope of the
104
property owner’s consent. In Miller, the plaintiff sued his wife, from
105
Upon separation, the plaintiff told
whom he had been separated.
106
his wife not to enter the property without his consent.
Subsequently, the couple attempted to reconcile but were still legally
107
During the separation, the defendant hired a private
separated.
investigator to install a surveillance camera in the plaintiff’s bedroom
108
while the plaintiff was not home.
The defendant argued that as the plaintiff’s wife, she had
109
permission to enter the premises and could give others that right.
The court found that, even if the defendant had consent to be on the
plaintiff’s property, the defendant could still exceed the scope of that
110
Thus, when the defendant installed the surveillance
consent.
cameras, her actions potentially extended beyond the scope of the
111
consent to constitute a trespass.
However, there has been inconsistency among courts as to
whether fraudulently obtained consent may qualify as an affirmative
112
In Dresnick v. American Broadcasting
defense to trespass.

99. Id. at 146.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 147.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 149.
104. Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350, 355 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996), review denied, 483
S.E.2d 172 (N.C. 1997).
105. Id. at 352.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 355.
110. Id. at 355–56.
111. Id.
112. See Desnick v. Am. Broad. Corp., 44 F.3d 1345, 1354 (7th Cir. 1995).
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Corporation, the court held that fraudulent intent did not negate the
113
114
defense of consent. The defendant was a broadcasting company.
The defendant sent seven individuals undercover to investigate a
115
cataract surgeon by posing as patients. The undercover actors were
not interested in eye surgery, but had stated otherwise in the
116
interview with the plaintiff. The plaintiff stated that he would not
have allowed the undercover agent onto his property had he not been
117
deceived.
Despite these misrepresentations, the court found that the
consent was valid. Accordingly, the court found the defendants were
118
not liable for trespass. The court distinguished this case from other
fraudulent consent cases, noting that the trespass occurred in a
professional and not a personal setting, that the trespass did not
disrupt the workplace, and that it did not occur in the plaintiff’s
119
home.
Applying the logic from Steenberg and the fraudulent consent
cases, there is an argument that the INCOs could maintain a trespass
action against Mono. The INCOs brought the chair into their home,
not knowing that there was an electronic signal granting Mono access
into their homes. They were never aware that any parties were
connected to the chair. Even if the INCOs’ act of bringing the chair
into the home could qualify as granting consent to the chair to enter,
it was a misrepresentation for Mono to intentionally hide the device
with the hopes that the INCOs would unknowingly bring it into their
homes.
Furthermore, applying the logic from Brookes, the INCOs
granted the chair entrance to function as a chair, and the GPS signal
would have exceeded the scope of the intended consent. It would
also not meet the Dresnik exception because the INCOs brought the
chairs into homes, and not professional offices. Thus, even though
there were no damages to the property, Mono may have entered
without consent, creating trespass liability.
However, this again returns to the questions of ownership. If the
INCOs had come to own the chair and the GPS device, there may not

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1348.
Id. at 1352.
Id. at 1351.
Id. at 1352–53.
Id.
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have been a trespass because one cannot trespass onto their own
property. Thus technology has outgrown the clear lines of precedent
and it is unclear whether or not the entry of the GPS device would
qualify as an intentional intrusion onto property trespass.
B. Invasion of Privacy

The Supreme Court has historically granted the highest level of
120
privacy protection to the home. Tort law has also recognized and
121
This part considers whether
protected the privacy of residences.
Mono violated privacy laws by hiding a GPS device in a chair with the
intent that another would adopt the chair and unknowingly bring a
GPS signal into their homes.
122
The Restatement outlines causes of action for privacy invasions.
Most relevantly, Section 652B “provides a remedy when one ‘intrudes
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or
concerns’ if the intrusion is ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person.’”
In Nader v. General Motors, the court developed minimum
123
standards for an invasion of privacy claim.
The plaintiff sued for
invasion of privacy after the defendant had investigated the plaintiff
by interviewing his friends to discover his personal views and sexual
proclivities, making harassing phone calls at odd hours, accosting the
plaintiff with women to attempt to entrap the plaintiff into illicit
124
The court determined that
relationships, and tapping the phone.
liability for invasion of privacy requires that the information sought
be confidential in nature and the defendant’s conduct unreasonably
125
Additionally, the information must not be as readily
intrusive.
available with normal observation and inquiry as to be publicly
126
available. Applying this logic, the court determined the defendant
was only liable for invasion of privacy for tapping the plaintiff’s
127
phone which went beyond mere observation.
The INCOs will unlikely be able to sustain an invasion of privacy
action for intrusion on solitude. Mono’s method was likely intrusive.
Hiding a surveillance device that the INCOs brought into their homes

120. See Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B; SOLOVE, ROTENBERG &
SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION AND PRIVACY LAW 30–31 (2d ed. 2006).
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
123. Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970).
124. Id. at 650.
125. Id. at 652.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 653–55.
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seems more intrusive than questioning friends, or making a phone
call. In terms of the technology, it is a close match to the phone tap
that qualified as invasive in Nader. However, possession of the chair
is not likely to be deemed information that would not otherwise be
available with normal observation and inquiry. The chairs were
found on a public street and were taken by the INCOs in the public
view. The chairs were in no way concealed to prevent the acquisition
of this knowledge from the general public. Thus, the INCOs would
not likely be successful in an action for intrusion on solitude against
Mono.

IV. Statutory Recommendation
Mono’s covert use of GPS devices in their products for marketing
purposes invited Internet viewers into the homes of others without
the homeowners’ consent. Although the location of a chair may not
be sensitive enough to have sent the INCOs immediately to their
lawyers, the idea of accepting such intrusive marketing gimmicks into
our homes comes at the price of our privacy.
The current legal framework fails to provide a suitable course of
action for the INCOs who unwittingly became the subjects of the
Experiment. Trespass to chattels may be applicable by a judge who is
willing to water down the damage requirement and sufficiently think
“outside the box” to grant property rights in the chair to the INCOs.
However, should an occasional policy-driven judge take this stance,
because of these weaknesses in the legal logic, it is not likely to
provide a consistently effective remedy for technological intrusions
on privacy.
While intentional intrusion to land may provide legal recourse, it
also fails to ensure consistent protection against electronic intrusions.
The judge must be willing to interpret the use of the GPS device as a
trespass, and must also find that the finder’s act of bringing in the
chair was not, in itself, consent. Although precedent regarding
fraudulent intent might protect against an affirmative defense of
consent, courts have failed to rule consistently on the sufficiency of
fraudulent consent. Thus, although likely a stronger claim than
trespass to chattels, this claim could also be denied by a judge.
Further, extending the trespass cause of action to electronic
128
One such criticism is that electronic
trespass has raised criticism.
129
trespass is overreaching. For example:

128. Burk supra note 27, at 54–55.
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[u]nwanted telephone callers would seem to be engaging in
trespass to chattels; the telephone call sends signals to the
instrument of the recipient. So, too, with fax machines that
receive unwelcome transmissions. Radios and televisions that
receive unwanted transmissions are impinged upon by
electromagnetic waves that induce the movement of electrons
130
within the receiver.
Forward-thinking minds have been working to draft remedies in
Washington to protect Americans from other technological invasions
131
of privacy. For example, the U.S. House of Representatives passed
132
the I-SPY Act, or Internet Spyware Prevention Act of 2005. This
Act creates criminal liability for the use of spyware to collect personal
133
information without the user’s knowledge.
Information protected
as “personal” is defined as:
A first and last name; a home or other physical address; an
electronic mail address; a telephone number; a Social Security
number, tax identification number, driver’s license number,
passport numbers, or any other government-issued
identification number; or a credit card or bank account
number or any password or access code associated with a
134
credit card or bank account.
Commission of these acts would be punishable by fine or
135
136
imprisonment. Unfortunately, the Act has not yet become a law.
While the I-SPY Act does not yet have the force of law, it
provides a syllogism within which to frame a law that specifically and
expressly creates legal liability for technological intrusions, including
Mono’s intrusion into the home of the INCOs with the GPS device.

129. Id. at 34.
130. Id.
131. Tim Mammadov, Spyware Laws, EHOW, http://www.ehow.com/about_5422099
_spyware-laws.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
132. Internet Spyware (I-SPY) Prevention Act of 2007, and the Securing Air-Craft Cockpits
Against Lasers Act of 2007: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On the Constitution of the H. Comm.
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1 (2007),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/35113.PDF.
133. Internet Spyware (I-SPY) Prevention Act of 2005, H.R. 744, 109th Cong. § 2(b)

(2005).
134. Id. at § 2(d)(2) (formatting omitted).
135. Id. at § 2(b).
136. See Mammadov, supra note 131.
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Such a law should include both criminal and civil liability to not only
deter corporations from using technology to take advantage of
persons for their profit, but also to provide compensation to those
who have fallen victim to such intrusions.
The law should be forward-looking, taking into account future
technologies and seemingly minor intrusions. Mono’s use of GPS
technology to monitor a chair may, on its own, seem unobtrusive.
However, the level of intrusion these technologies are capable of can
be severe. One clear example would be if clothing companies marked
their products with GPS devices. This could show a person’s location
at any given time, carving away significantly at the consumer’s
privacy. Thus, the legislation should forbid the use of tracking
devices to collect information without clear consent.

V. Conclusion
“The Real Good Experiment” was an experiment in pushing the
legal limits. The advertising campaign financed by Blue Dot brought
Internet viewers into the INCOs’ homes without their knowledge.
Although the laws of trespass to chattels have more recently been
invoked to protect against technological intrusions on property, the
ambiguity regarding damages and title to the chairs makes it a weak
claim. While the other trespass tort, intentional intrusion to land,
may also be viable, the question of ownership over the chairs again
arises, making the answer difficult to ascertain. So although the
trespass laws may work as a weapon when wielded by an openminded judge, the technology has largely outgrown the precedent.
Privacy laws also fail to protect against unwanted guests in the
realm of private life. It is true the law against intrusion on seclusion
would protect against information that was not otherwise available to
the public. However, it ignores the intrusion caused by the mere act
of sneaking onto another’s property to obtain that information.
Under this provision, it would seem even the most creative judges
would have difficulty in applying this legal cause of action to Mono.
Mono may escape liability today, but this gap in privacy
protection should be filled. By drafting a law that expressly addresses
the issue of growing technology and provides clear limitations on use
to protect the property and privacy rights of citizens, the legislature
can create a more clear legal foundation for judges. This would
create more consistent protection and remove judges from the role of
being judicial legislators.
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